“부시 노림수는 '낮은 수준'의 합의문"

<인터뷰> 세계적 한반도전문가 존 페퍼의 '6자회담 전망'

노무현대통령의 이라크 파병 결정으로 20일 열리는 한-미정상회담에서 어떤 북핵 해법이 나올 것인지에 국내외의 비상한 관심이 쏠리고 있다. 노무현 정부 일각에서는 이라크에 파병해야 원만한 북핵 해법이 나올 것이라는 주장을 펴왔기 때문이다.

그러나 조지 W. 부시 미대통령은 이라크 파병에도 불구하고 지난 19일(현지시간) 탁신 태국총리와의 대화에서 북한이 요구하고 있는 불가침조약을 맺을 생각이 없음을 분명히 했다. 그 대신 '대북 안전보장'에 대해선 문서화 가능성을 흘렸다. 내심 부시의 '화끈한 약속'을 기대했던 노대통령으로서는 곤혹스런 상황전개다.

이와 관련, 세계적 국제문제전문가인 존 페퍼는 "부시가 원하는 것은 낮은 수준의 합의문일뿐"이라며 부시의 일방주의 외교를 비판했다. 하지만 그는 부시가 내년 대선을 앞두고 '이라크의 늪'에 빠져 허덕이는 시점에 새로운 국제분쟁을 원하지 않고 있어 낮은 수준의 북-미 합의 가능성을 점치기도 했다.

이에 프레시안은 한반도문제에도 관심이 많아 남북한을 수차례 방문하기도 했던 존 페퍼와 최근의 상황 전개와 관련한 긴급 이메일 인터뷰를 가졌다.

***"美, 북한이 군사무기 이용에 유혹 느끼지 않게끔 북한과 합의해야"**

존 페퍼는 <충격파 : 혁명후 동유럽>의 저자이자 미 민간 싱크탱크인 '포린 폴러시 인 포커스(FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS, FPIF)의 자문위원이기도 한 세계적 국제문제전문가이다. 그는 미국의 대외정책에 관해 연구해 왔으며 이와 관련해 왕성한 저술활동을 펼쳐오고 있다.

특히 그는 지난 7월 FPIF 홈페이지에 '무시무시한 대칭:워싱턴과 평양'이라는 글을 통해 북한과 미국의 강경파들에 의해 치달아 온 무모한 상호의존을 비판해 국제사회의 폭넓은 공감을 얻었으며, 지난 2월에는 '한국, '독립의 축'에 합류해'라는 칼럼을 통해 미국의 일방주의를 비판하며 한국의 새로운 자주노선에 비상한 관심을 기울이는 등 미국내 비판적인 지식인으로 자리매김하고 있다.

존 페퍼는 프레시안과의 인터뷰에서 "현재의 북핵관련 대치상황을 종식시키기 위해선 단순히 북한의 핵프로그램 동결만이 아니라 북한이 여러 가능한 선택사항 가운데 군사적 무기를 이용하는 데 흥미를 느끼지 못하도록 보장해주어야만 한다"고 강조하면서 그러한 보장 방법으로 "미국이 북한과 양자대화에 나서고 군축을 시행하며 북미관계 정상화에 나서야 한다"고 주장했다.

그는"북한의 핵 프로그램 동결과 경제보상 및 안전보장을 교환하는 합의는 물론 동북아지역 주변국들의 참여와 동의가 필요하지만 그런 합의의 핵심축은 북한과 미국의 양자합의"라고 지적하면서 "현재의 핵위기를 해결하기 위한 첫 번째 단계는 미국과 북한간 양자합의를 이끌어내는 것이라고 강조했다.

이어 그는 "양자합의에서 미국은 북한이 미사일과 핵 프로그램을 동결하는 대가로 실질적인 혜택을 제공해주어야 한다"면서 북한이 필요로 하는 에너지 공급과 안전보장을 약속하라고 미국에 촉구했다.

에너지 공급을 위한 방안에는 미국의 중유공급 이외에 "북한뿐만 아니라 심지어 미국 기업을 비롯한 동북아 여러 국가에 이득이 되는" 러시아 천연가스 공급을 대안으로 제시했다.

***"북-미 즉시 관계정상화 맺어 기본적인 대화틀로 활용해야"**

안전보장 방안에 대해서는 한반도에서의 군축을 강조했다.

그는"단순히 미국이 공격하지 않겠다는 약속을 하는 문서는 유용한 합의틀이 아니며 미국은 이 지역에서의 이미 시행하고 있는 용산기지 이전이나 제2사단 배치 등과 같은 조치에 기반한 군사력 감축을 실시해야한다"면서 "더 나아가 한국과 일본, 중국을 포함한 동북아 군축과정에 미국이 나서야 한다"고 큰 그림을 그렸다.

북한과의 관계정상화에 관련해서는 "1990년대 초부터 미국은 북한의 핵포기 대가로 관계정상화를 활용해 왔는데 두 문제를 연관짓지 말고 즉시 북한과의 관계정상화를 위한 과정을 시작해야 한다"고 말해 관계정상화와 북핵문제의 분리를 주장했다.

그는 "관계정상화는 거래 대상이 아니라 여러 복잡한 북미문제를 해결할 수 있는 기본틀로 활용해야 한다"면서 "북한이 영원히 국제사회에서 이방인으로 남아있으면 핵억제력을 포기할 만큼 안전보장이 이루어졌다고 느끼지 못할 것이지만 관계정상화를 맺게 되면 북한은 대량파괴무기 이용 욕구를 점차 느끼지 못하게 될 것"으로 보았다.

***"6자회담에 임하는 부시 전략, '낮은 수준'의 합의문 도출"**

그는 북핵문제 해결을 위한 6자회담을 "미국이 북한과의 협상을 회피하기 위한 구도"라고 비판적으로 정의하면서, 그 전망에 대해서도 유보적인 태도를 보였다.

그는 "미국내 강경파는 미국이 핵무기를 보유하려는 북한에 강공정책을 펴지 않는 데 대해 부시 행정부에 불만을 갖고 있고, 온건파는 온건파대로 부시 행정부가 진지하게 협상에 나서지 않고 있다고 비판하고 있다"면서 2004년 대선을 앞두고 있는 부시 행정부가 북한과 일정한 합의에 도달할 가능성에 무게를 두었다.

특히 일각에서는 부시 행정부가 북한을 공격하는 등의 '10월 위기' 등을 주장하기도 했으나 그는 "북한에 대한 군사적 조치는 너무 위험하고 부시에게 역풍이 부는 계기가 될 수 있다"면서 오히려 "북핵문제 해결이 2004년 대선을 앞둔 조지 W. 부시 대통령의 지지율을 끌어올릴 가능성이 있다"고 보았다.

그는 하지만 "부시의 재선에 영향을 미칠 북한과의 합의문 작성 협상에 대해 부시 행정부 내에서 충분한 의견이 모아지지 않고 있다"고 지적하면서 "미국이 북한과 맺는 합의문 형태는 부시가 합의문으로 부담감을 지지 않을 정도의 낮은 수준의 합의문 형태가 될 것"이라고 예측했다.

부시 행정부 내의 강경파와 온건파 사이의 타협한 지점은 바로 '엉성한' 합의문 도출과 은밀한 체제변화추구라는 것이다.

***새 저서, 한반도의 남북한 상황과 대미관계 조명, 한반도위기 해결할 대안 제시**

그는 최근 <북한과 남한 : 위기의 시대에서의 미국 정책>(NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA : U.S. POLICY AT A TIME OF CRISIS)이라는 새로운 책을 저술했는데 이 책에서 그는 남북한 상황과 대미관계를 조명하고 있다.

또 그는 미국은 한반도에서 남북한의 통일과 협력을 추구하기 보다는 분열정책을 펴고 있다고 주장하면서 한반도의 현 위기를 해결하고 동북아에서의 평화와 안정을 위한 대안을 제시하고 있다.

그는 이 책에서 미국이 분열정책을 펴는 이유로 미국의 동아시아정책과 함께 "통일된 한반도는 친미국가가 되지 않을 우려 때문"으로 보고 있다. 즉 남한에서의 반미감정과 북한의 주체사상 등으로 인해 민족주의 감정이 고양돼 미국에 상당히 비판적인 통일 국가가 들어설 가능성이 있다는 것이다.

이어 그는 이 책에서 미 행정부의 정권교체에 따른 대한반도 정책도 조망하고 있다.

***"부시 행정부의 외교정책은 제국주의"**

그는 이어 북핵문제와 이라크 파병을 연관짓는 일부 한국사회의 분위기에 우려를 표시하기도 했다.

지난 2월 24일 한국을 미국의 일방주의에 대항하는 '독립의 축'으로 명명하기도 했던 존 페퍼는 3월 한국군을 이라크에 파견한다는 노무현 대통령의 담화이후엔 "미국이 북한과의 외교적 노력이 실패했고 북한에 대한 군사공격이 필요하다고 선언한다면 그때 당신은 어떻게 하겠는가? 미국과 여러 나라들이 한국인들의 위험에도 불구하고 군사행동은 '불가피한 조치'라고 주장하면 어떻하겠나"라며 허탈한 심정을 토로하기도 했다.

끝으로 그는 "부시 행정부는 '우리도 할 여유가 있으면 다자주의를 펼칠 것이지만 현재의 시점은 미국이 혼자서라도 해야 할 임무이기에 일방주의를 펴고 있다'(multinational when we can and unilateralism when we must)고 항변하고 있다"고 지적하면서 "부시행정부의 외교정책은 제국주의"라고 비난했다.

그는 부시의 외교정책을 제국주의로 보는 이유를 다음과 같이 말했다.

"클린턴 행정부는 미국의 임무를 다른 나라가 해주길 원했다. 물론 이들 국가는 미국의 일을 대신 해주고 있다는 사실을 자신의 이득에 따라 행동하고 있다고 교묘하게 생각하게 만들면서 말이다. 하지만 부시 행정부는 단순히 다른 나라들이 미국을 따르기를 원하고 있다. 이들 나라들이 미국의 의도에 대해서 어떻게 생각하는지는 상관하지 않는다. 이것이 바로 헤게모니 국가와 제국주의 국가의 차이점이다."

다음은 이메일 인터뷰 전문이다.

PRESSian : Your new book <NORTH KOREA/SOUTH KOREA : U.S. POLICY AT A TIME OF CRISIS> came out at a very appropriate time considering the current situation on the Korean peninsula. Please tell us what you are trying to accomplish with your new book.

JOHN FEFFER : The most important task is to prevent war on the Korean peninsula. Most Americans do not know very much about Korea and especially North Korea. Many don't know anything about the Korean War. Many Americans cannot find Korea on a map of the world. Many don't know that Koreans in north and south speak the same language and share the same ethnicity. This lack of knowledge is very dangerous, because the Bush administration can easily manipulate public opinion. I wanted to publish a short book that is both inexpensive and easy to read -- to reach as many people as possible. In this way, I wanted to do what I can as a writer to inform Americans about Korea, north and south, and emphasize the dangers of current U.S. policy as well as the horrific consequences of a war on the peninsula.

PRESSian : In your book you said, "The current US administration employs 'a policy of divide and conquer' rather than 'a policy favoring reunification of Korea.'"Can you elaborate on this?

JOHN FEFFER : A divided Korea and a divided East Asia are useful for the Bush administration. A divided Korea ensures that United States has a military foothold on the peninsula. A divided East Asia makes it possible for the United States to maintain 100,000 troops in the region. The Pentagon has long argued that the U.S. role in Asia is to prevent a dangerous power vacuum and to serve as a buffer. If Korea unifies, this rationale becomes more difficult to maintain. Also, a unified Korea might very easily decide to move closer to China than the United States. The U.S. government, I think, is worried about Korean nationalism, that the so-called anti-Americanism of the South will combine with North Korean juche and create a unified country that is very critical of the United States.

I also wanted to shed some light on U.S. policy toward Korea for all those who are baffled by its twists and turns. Outside the United States, the shift from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration must seem incomprehensible. In my book, I wanted to reveal the roots of the Bush administration's policies as well as the flaws in the Clinton approach.

PRESSian : In the conclusion of your new book, you propose various ways of resolving the North Korean crisis and alternative approaches to achieving peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Can you elaborate on these?

JOHN FEFFER : For better or worse, the first step to resolving the current crisis is a bilateral agreement between the United States and North Korea. The United States has to provide real, substantial benefits in order for North Korea to freeze its nuclear program and missile exports. North Korea needs energy. A pipeline deal involving Russian natural gas would benefit not only North Korea but all the countries in the region (and even U.S. companies). North Korea needs security assurances. Personally I think that a piece of paper saying that the United States promises not to invade is not a very useful document. I would rather see a U.S. commitment to force reductions that build on what the Pentagon is already implementing in the region (such as the closure of the Yongsan base and the redeployment of the 2nd infantry division away from the DMZ). Also important would be a strong U.S. commitment to a regional process of disarmament that includes South Korea, Japan, and China.

An agreement on freezing North Korea's nuclear program in exchange for economic incentives and security assurances, like the 1994 Agreed Framework, will need regional consensus and commitment. However, the core of any such agreement will inevitably be bilateral.

It would also be useful to reverse the way the United States has traditionally viewed engagement with North Korea. Since the early 1990s, Washington has sought to use the normalization of relations with Pyongyang as a reward for the cessation of its nuclear program. Instead, the United States should uncouple the two issues and immediately begin the process of establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea. Rather than a bargaining chip, normalized relations should become a framework for addressing all outstanding U.S.-North Korean issues. North Korea will not likely feel secure enough to relinquish its nuclear deterrent if it forever remains an outlier, and normalization is an important step toward a future in which North Korea is unlikely to use whatever weapons of destruction it possesses.

PRESSian : Please tell us what you believe should be the direction of South Korea's foreign policy especially toward its relationship with the US to achieve the eventual reunification while maintaining the independence of the Korean peninsula.

JOHN FEFFER : Ultimately, I would like to see South Korea join with other countries -- Germany, France, Brazil, South Africa, Russia -- to form an axis of independence. Only through the cooperation of middle powers can a sufficient counterforce to U.S. foreign policy be constructed.

But South Korea is in a very delicate position. The U.S.-South Korean relationship is 50 years old and constrains the full independence of South Korea's foreign policy. And South Korea has other, more basic, foreign policy objectives than uniting with other middle powers -- namely, the peaceful unification of the peninsula. So that is why Pres. Roh Moo Hyun has been seeking a deal with the United States -- South Korea will support the U.S. occupation of Iraq if Washington supports Seoul's unification policy. It is very tempting to make unification the single most important foreign policy objective and compromise on all other matters. But there is a danger here: the United States does not always keep to its half of the bargain.

PRESSian : Last August, prior to the first round of 6 nation-multilateral talks in Beijing, you mentioned that even though the US was not showing enough effort due to the hawks in the US administration, it was still better to continue the talks than to have no talks at all.

Now it seems that an atmosphere for negotiation is shaping up. There is a possibility of a second round of 6 nation talks in December; Colin Powell recently mentioned that the US is drafting proposals for a multilateral deal to secure North Korea. Please give your opinion on the possibility of resolving the in the second round of 6 nation talks and how it could be achieved.

JOHN FEFFER : The Bush administration has been receiving a lot of criticism from the foreign policy community here over its policy toward North Korea. The hawks are complaining that North Korea has crossed the "red line" of acquiring a nuclear weapon and the Bush administration hasn't retaliated. The doves are complaining that the administration is not negotiating in good faith. So no one is happy with the administration's approach to North Korea. With an election coming up and the Democrats looking for weaknesses in current foreign policy, the Bush administration is looking for some kind of agreement.

I think, however, that the Bush administration wants the weakest, most superficial agreement possible -- just to last until the 2004 elections. The Bush administration still believes that the government in Pyongyang will collapse. It is still pursuing policies of military containment and economic isolation. It is still hoping for regime change. The compromise between the hawks and doves in the administration is to get a flimsy agreement and pursue regime change covertly.

PRESSian : You pointed out that the US administration is divided into hawks and doves over North Korea, and its ultimate goal in developing nuclear weapons and the likelihood of the survival of the North Korean regime.

Please give your opinion on North Korea's ultimate goal in developing nuclear weapons and the likelihood of the survival of the North Korean regime.

JOHN FEFFER : Particularly after the recent war in Iraq, North Korea has determined that the only credible way of preventing the United States from attacking is a nuclear deterrent. This has to be a viable nuclear deterrent and not simply a program on the way to building a weapon. If North Korea only had a program, the United States would try to eliminate the program by military means. So North Korea has argued that it already has nuclear weapons. Deterrence works if the other side believes in the existence of nuclear weapons.

I doubt, however, whether North Korea in fact has such weapons. Even if North Korea has reprocessed sufficient amount of plutononium, it still must weaponize the material. We have no proof that it has either reprocessed enough material or has the miniaturization technology to make warheads. Finally, I don't think that North Korea is yet able to deliver a nuclear weapon on a missile. It hasn't sufficiently tested its medium-range missiles and it doesn't have the heat-shield technology to prevent a warhead from burning up on reentry.

The question often asked in Washington is: why should North Korea give up its nuclear deterrent? How can it ever feel safe when the United States retains the capability of launching a devastating air war against the country? It is very possible that North Korea will always try to retain a recessed capability -- the ability like Japan to produce nuclear weapons within a few months if necessary.

Our best hope for ending the current nuclear standoff, therefore, is not simply to freeze North Korea's nuclear program. Rather, the objective should be to ensure that Pyongyang becomes less and less interested in using the military tools in its toolbox. North Korea, like China, must begin to view military conflict as jeopardizing its own economic transformation.

PRESSian : China, Russia, and Japan are participating in the 6 nation talks. China, in particular, is generally considered to be a key player in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. In your opinion, what is China's policy toward the Korean peninsula and China's position in regard to China's relationship with US?

JOHN FEFFER : China has been losing patience with North Korea since the early 1990s. It doesn't want another nuclear power on its border. It is tired to subsidizing the country with food and fuel. It is frustrated that Pyongyang's economic reform doesn't move faster. In some ways, China is suffering a bout of amnesia. The Chinese don't remember how long it took for them to push through economic reform. They don't remember the starving and suffering of the Great Leap Forward period or the desperate attempts of the Chinese military-industrial complex to develop nuclear weapons.

Still, a patient China can play a very positive role in helping North Korea move toward greater engagement with the world and more flexibility in its economy. This is very much in China's interest. It wants to be the primary power in East Asia. But North Korea is a very big handicap preventing China from attaining this position.

The Chinese leadership's attitudes toward the United States is generally positive. Beijing is happy to fight against terrorism as long as it can repress its own "terrorists" in Xinjiang and elsewhere. Beijing needs detente with the U.S. in order to move to the next stage of its economic reform, namely moving to more value-added exports and ensuring that its economic growth is a great deal more equitable. But the Chinese leadership is also very realistic. It has watched the Bush administration move closer to Taiwan. It is worried about pressures from the U.S. to float the yuan. It is skeptical of U.S. measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, which involves the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction on the high seas.

So, China needs good relations with the United States but is quite aware of the anti-Chinese lobby within the current administration.

PRESSian : Some people hold the view that resolving the North Korean nuclear stand off could be affected by the upcoming US presidential election where the Bush administration could try to use the North Korean card to their political advantage. What is your take on this?

JOHN FEFFER : Some people have argued that the Bush administration might pull an "October surprise" by launching a war against North Korea. I don't think the administration is planning such a surprise. The Pentagon is very aware that a war on the Korean peninsula would not look good on television. A military attack is too risky and could easily backfire against Bush.

The other possibility -- an agreement with North Korea that boosts Bush's popularity -- is possible. But I don't think that there is sufficient consensus within the Bush administration to negotiate the kind of agreement that will have an impact on Bush's reelection chances. A weak agreement with North Korea might prove as great a liability for Bush as no agreement at all.

PRESSian : Previously in February, you called South Korea "the Axis of Independence " and praised president Rho as the world's best hope to avoid war on the Korean peninsula. However, you expressed your deep disappointment in Roh's decision to send non-combat troops to Iraq.

The US government is again asking South Korea to send more troops to Iraq, this time combat troops. In your opinion, how should the South Korean government respond to this request?

JOHN FEFFER : I don't believe that South Korea should send combat troops to Iraq to assist in the U.S. occupation. If, however, the United States agrees to greater UN involvement and a more substantial transition to Iraqi self-governance, then I think all UN members should support the safeguarding and rebuilding of Iraq. I did not support the war, but the war took place. It would be irresponsible to pull out all troops at this point and let anarchy prevail in Iraq. It is time for the United States to step aside and let the UN and the Iraqis themselves work out a solution.

PRESSian : Some argue that South Korea's refusal to send more troops to Iraq would undermine the position of the moderates in the US administration, which could complicate the North Korean crisis. They also argue that South Korea should help the US in this time of need so the US would be more willing to work with the South Korean government in resolving the North Korean crisis in a peaceful manner. What is your opinion on these arguments?

JOHN FEFFER : I won't pretend to fully understand the dynamics within the Bush administration. Many people in the U.S. complain that the North Korean government is opaque. I would argue that the Bush administration can be equally opaque.

As I mentioned above, I think it's risky to link the Iraq issue to resolution of the Korean crisis. It reminds me of the deal that Henry Kissinger arranged in the 1970s. In order to open the door with China, Kissinger needed a conduit. It turned out that West Pakistan was the perfect intermediary. But this meant that the West Pakistani leader Yahya Khan knew that he could send in troops to East Pakistan (the future Bangladesh) to brutally suppress secessionists in March 1971 and the U.S. State Department would not complain. The Nixon administration continued to need the support of West Pakistan for opening up dialogue with Beijing. This was a supreme example of realpolitik, and it means that one of the great diplomatic openings of the Cold War was paid for by the blood of East Pakistanis.

PRESSian : The Bush administration is facing harsh criticism on its unilateral foreign policy since 9-11. Although the Bush administration has shown some signs of multilateralism toward the UN resolution on Iraq, many nations remain skeptical. Please give your opinion on the direction of the Bush administration's current foreign policy.

JOHN FEFFER : U.S. unilateralism has been such a failure that even the Bush administration has to acknowledge the problems. Afghanistan is in a perilous state. The U.S. army is bogged down in a quagmire in Iraq. The conflict on the Korean peninsula is far from resolution. These failures have strengthened the hands of the so-called moderates in the Bush administration.

At the same time, the hardliners are still at it. They're refusing to compromise very much on the UN resolution concerning Iraq. They're stepping up efforts to effect regime change in Iran. They're playing tough with Europe over agriculture, with Russia over Iran, with Israel against Palestine. At times, the administration seems to be favoring multilateralism, as in the 6-Party talks. But in fact, this is not a vote in support of multilateralism. So far, this is an attempt to avoid negotiating a deal with North Korea.

The Bush administration is pursuing a policy of "multilateralism when we can and unilateralism when we must." At the same time, the hardliners in the administration are doing what they can to destroy as much of multilateralism as possible in the time that is allotted them by our electoral system.

The Clinton administration wanted other countries to do the bidding of the United States but it wanted those countries to think that they were acting in their own interests. The Bush administration simply wants other countries to follow the U.S. lead, regardless of how they might feel about the decision. This is the difference between hegemony and empire.